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Introduction
This paper takes the form of a cautionary tale for those who teach informal fallacies. The
worry is that students in critical thinking and introductory logic courses often misunderstand
what does and does not count as a fallacy because they “overlearn” the fallacies presented to
them. In other words, after taking a course that covers informal fallacies, students often start to
see fallacies where none exist; they confuse plausible arguments with fallacious ones. My
evidence for this claim is very much anecdotal, but I assume that other instructors have had
experiences similar to mine. I have noticed, in teaching students who have taken introductory
courses in logic and critical thinking, or students who have been given a crash course in logic at
the beginning of my own courses, that there is a tendency to reject arguments for questionable
reasons. These reasons would not have occurred to students if they had not been given a list of
fallacies to avoid at all costs. That is not to say, of course, that fallacies should not be taught.
Rather, the conclusion to be drawn is that instructors and textbook authors ought to be very
careful in how they present informal fallacies.1
It is quite common (though again my evidence is anecdotal) for instructors and textbooks
to present students with a definition of a particular fallacy and then to continue by providing
clear examples wherein the fallacy is committed. Then the next fallacy is presented, and so on. I
suggest that what is missing in this method of presentation are examples where the fallacy in
question is not committed, but where it might be tempting to think that it is. The reason for
teaching informal fallacies in the first place is that arguments that are fallacious in particular
ways might seem like good arguments unless one is versed in the ways that arguments can go
wrong. But the same can be said of the fallacies themselves; sometimes arguments might seem
to commit a fallacy when they in fact do not. So again, my very modest proposal is that teachers
of informal fallacies should be careful to provide examples of arguments which might appear to
commit a fallacy but really don’t. This method should prevent students from overlearning
certain fallacies. In what follows I will catalog some informal fallacies which I have found to be
pedagogically problematic and provide examples of how students sometimes misapply those
fallacies to legitimate arguments. All of the examples are real-life cases taken from my own
teaching experience, and I trust that some of them will strike a chord with other instructors. The
claims I make about what does and does not count as a fallacy are likely to be very obvious to
readers of this paper, but the point is that they are not always so obvious to students.
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Ad Populum
Typically the ad populum fallacy is defined like this:
Everyone (or nearly everyone) thinks p is true.
__________________________________________
P is true.
This seems like a very sensible way to present the fallacy, and furthermore making use of this
form of argument is usually very suspect.2 For example, some people are inclined to believe that
some sort of deity must exist on the basis of an argument which goes something like this:
Throughout history and in almost every culture, most people have believed that God exists.
__________________________________________________________________________
God exists.
This argument clearly commits the ad populum fallacy and it is clear that the premise does not
adequately support the conclusion. But consider socially constructed facts such as facts about
money. Suppose someone argues in the following way:
Everyone (or nearly everyone) thinks this piece of paper (which depicts a past leader and which
is issued by the government) is worth $5.
_____________________________________________________________________________
This piece of paper is indeed worth $5.
Now this argument is not formally valid. There is a suppressed premise having to do
with the nature of money and its value. The worry, however, is that someone who has been
taught the ad populum fallacy might disregard the argument altogether. But there seems to be
pretty good reason to accept that the argument is semantically valid (and hence informally
strong). Arguably, we should accept that it is semantically valid for the same reason that we
should accept that the following argument is semantically valid:
Penelope is someone’s sister.
________________________
Penelope is female.
For this reason, students should be shown how and why some arguments that may at first appear
to commit the ad populum fallacy do not.

The Naturalistic Fallacy
The naturalistic fallacy is committed when one confuses the way things are with the way
they ought to be. In my experience it rears its ugly head in introductory classes quite often when
the discussion turns to issues in applied ethics. For example, when confronted with a utilitarian
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argument for the claim that vegetarianism is morally obligatory, many students reply with a
counter-argument very much like this:
(A)
Unlike some other animals, humans are born with a digestive systems suitable to eating meat.
Unlike some other animals, humans have teeth suitable to eating meat.
Most humans are quite naturally compelled to eat meat.
___________________________________________________________________________
It is morally permissible for humans to eat meat.
This attempt to derive moral permissibility from the status quo is a good example of the
naturalistic fallacy. The reasoning used here is certainly suspect. Still, I am inclined to think
that my students are on to something when they offer this argument. What they are on to is the
ought-implies-can principle. They reason that if humans are naturally meat eaters, then they
can’t help but be meat eaters. Therefore, given the ought-implies-can principle, it is nonsensical
to say that it is wrong for humans to eat meat. Their mistake is not, strictly speaking, equating
what is the case with what ought to be the case. That is, they are not under the impression that it
is OK for humans to eat meat just because humans do in fact eat meat. Rather, their mistake is to
think that the premises provide adequate evidence for the claim that humans are incapable of
refraining from eating meat. That this is a mistake is shown by the fact that the available
empirical evidence establishes conclusively that humans can refrain from eating meat, even if all
the premises of this argument are true.
Given this perceived connection between reasoning which appears to commit the
naturalistic fallacy and the ought-implies-can principle, it is perhaps not surprising that after
being introduced to the naturalistic fallacy, people might be inclined to think that any argument
which makes use of the ought-implies-can principle also commits the naturalistic fallacy. More
than one of my students has suggested that if the above argument is fallacious, then so is this
argument:
(B)
Some wild animals have digestive systems suitable to eating meat.
Some wild animals have teeth suitable to eating meat.
These same animals are quite naturally compelled to eat meat.
______________________________________________________
It is morally permissible for these wild animals to eat meat.
My students then proceed to tell me that it is ridiculous to think that this argument is fallacious
because, of course, it is not morally wrong for a wild carnivore to eat other animals for just the
kinds of reasons stated in the premises. So, the naturalistic fallacy must not be a true fallacy.
I suggest that what is going on here is that students are confusing two very different
senses in which some state of affairs might be “natural.” A state of affairs might be natural
insofar as it is the status quo – the historically normal way for things to be. To try to derive any
kind of moral norms from this sense of “natural” is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. But a state
of affairs might be natural in a different sense – natural insofar as it is the way things must be,
not merely how things happen to be. Assuming the truth of the ought-implies-can principle, it
seems like a good idea to derive moral norms from this sense of “natural.” Doing so does not
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involve committing the naturalistic fallacy. For if a state of affairs is natural in the second sense,
and if the ought-implies-can principle is true, then it follows that there can be no moral
obligation to prevent that state of affairs from obtaining. With respect to arguments (A) and (B)
above, it seems reasonable to suppose that the third premise in argument (A) is true only if it is
taken to mean that human meat eating is natural in the first sense of “natural.” (If this premise
were stated with the second sense of “natural” in mind, then it is easily refuted by pointing to the
fact that there are human vegetarians.) But the third premise in argument (B) is arguably true,
assuming the second sense of “natural.” When understood in this way, (A) fails to show that
human meat eating is morally permissible, but (B) is successful in showing that it is morally
permissible (or amoral) for a lion to eat an antelope.
It should be noted that some philosophers question the truth of the ought-implies-can
principle. But this view is highly controversial and presumably we do not want to say that to
make use of the principle is to commit a fallacy. The upshot is that in presenting the naturalistic
fallacy, instructors should make it very clear that the following two principles are not identical:
(1) What you ought to do is not always identical with what you do in fact.
(2) Anything that you ought to do is something that you are able to do in fact.
To deny (1) is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. To deny (2) is to adopt a rather controversial
view of ethics. At first glance it may be difficult to see how or why anyone might confuse (1)
and (2), but I suggest that students sometimes do just that. What I hope to have shown in this
section is that this confusion is not so inscrutable and consequently that instructors can and
should make efforts to prevent it.

Appeal to Authority
Arguments which rely too heavily on the testimony of others are fallacious. Nonetheless,
the appeal to authority fallacy can be overlearned. After being told about this fallacy, students
might be tempted to dismiss any argument the premises of which rely on expert testimony.
Usually textbooks are very clear that there is a difference between the two kinds of argument, but
still it is advisable for instructors to remind students that not all appeals to expert testimony
constitute illegitimate appeals to authority.3 When there is independent reason to think that a
particular authority is in a good position to know something, i.e., when there is good reason to
think that the authority in question really is an expert on the issue under consideration, then it
seems reasonable to use that authority’s testimony in order to support the conclusion of an
argument. As with the other fallacies discussed, the use of examples is a very effective way of
demonstrating the difference between a fallacious appeal to authority and an unproblematic
appeal to expert knowledge. Consider the following pair of arguments.
(A)
Einstein was a genius and much of what he said suggested that he believed in God.
____________________________________________________________________
God probably exists.
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(B)
Many physicists have reported that their experiments suggest that Einstein’s General Theory of
Relativity can be used repeatedly and consistently to make very accurate predictions.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity is probably correct.
Argument (A) is clearly problematic (yet surprisingly common in my experience). On
the other hand, the single premise of argument (B) does seem to lend some support to the
conclusion. Students should be made to appreciate the difference between the two appeals to
expert testimony. In short, argument (A) is fallacious because there is very little reason to think
that Einstein was really in a position to know whether or not there is a god. Argument (B) does
not have the same kind of problem, because those physicists who have conducted experiments
relevant to the General Theory of Relativity are presumably in a good position to know about its
predictive power.

Ad Hominem
Like the appeal to authority fallacy, the ad hominem fallacy is usually presented by
textbook authors with an eye toward preventing any confusion between it and legitimate
argument forms. But again, it is well worth an instructor’s time to make very explicit the
difference between fallacious ad hominem arguments and other, seemingly similar arguments.
And, again, it is helpful to provide examples. It should be made clear to students that there is a
difference between dismissing an argument simply because the argument is presented by so-andso, and being very skeptical of the truth of the premises of an argument because they are
presented by an untrustworthy source. So, for example, suppose a lawyer for a tobacco company
gives an argument the premises of which rely on studies conducted by the company he represents
and the conclusion of which is that cigarettes are not carcinogenic. To question the validity or
inductive strength of the argument solely on the basis that it is presented by a big tobacco lawyer
is to commit the ad hominem fallacy. But to question the truth of the premises seems perfectly
reasonable, given that the lawyer and the company he represents might have a fairly obvious
ulterior motive to mislead or lie about the effects of tobacco use. When evaluating arguments, it
is fine to consider the party that presents them, as long as one pays attention to those
characteristics of the party that are truly relevant to the worth of the argument. Expertise with
respect to the issue under consideration and ulterior motives are two such characteristics.

Tu Quoque
This often neglected fallacy (which is sometimes said to be a variety of the ad hominem)
is committed when one attempts to answer an objection by applying the objection to the
arguments or views of the objector. If I suggest that my view is not subject to your criticism
because your own view is subject to the same criticism, then I have committed the tu quoque or
“you also” fallacy.
The tu quoque fallacy is fairly common, and it seems like a good idea to warn students
about it. But it can be overlearned. The danger is that students will come to think that it is
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problematic to reject a self-refuting objection. But, of course, doing so is not to commit a
fallacy. Suppose the thoroughgoing relativist criticizes the objectivist’s view, saying that
objectivism with respect to truth must be false because truth is relative to what individuals
believe. In this situation it is perfectly reasonable and not at all fallacious for the objectivist to
respond by pointing out that if the relativist’s rationale is right, then the objection itself falters.
Or, at the very least, the relativist’s objection just amounts to the claim that she personally rejects
an objective view of truth. When the relativist proclaims that nothing is true, the objectivist has
an easy reply: the relativist’s proclamation amounts to the claim that it is true that nothing is
true. Therefore, the relativist’s objection seems to be subject to itself. Surely it is legitimate for
the objectivist to dismiss a naive relativist’s criticism on these grounds alone. Again, students
should be cautioned that it might be tempting to see a fallacy where there isn’t one.

Question Begging
There are two similar yet distinct ways to beg the question. The first, most obvious way
is to offer a circular argument. To beg the question in this way is to explicitly assume the truth
of the conclusion of an argument in one of the premises. In my experience students do not
typically have much difficulty in determining whether an argument is question begging in this
way. Perhaps this is because one need not look at the bigger context in which an argument is
presented in order to determine whether it is circular. It is possible to appreciate the circularity
of an argument by considering it in isolation.
The second, less obvious and more pedagogically problematic form of question begging
involves begging the question against a particular position. To beg the question in this way is
not necessarily to offer a circular argument. Rather, it is to offer an argument where at least one
of the premises is such that it is (a) likely to be rejected by one’s opponent and (b) not given any
independent support. In determining whether an argument is question begging in this sense, it is
obviously important to take into account the context in which the argument is presented.
Furthermore, it is not always easy to determine whether a premise is likely to be rejected by
one’s opponent, and it is even more difficult to decide on a set of standards for deciding whether
a premise is in need of further support or may instead merely be assumed true. Questions about
who has the burden of proof are likely to be raised, and such questions complicate the matter
considerably. For these reasons, deciding whether an argument is problematically question
begging can be extraordinarily difficult even for experts well versed in logic and critical
thinking. It should come as no surprise, then, that it poses a problem for students in introductory
classes as well; perhaps argumentation and philosophical debate is, by its very nature,
problematic in this regard.
Still, it seems that some students approach the issue of question begging arguments in a
very dubious manner. One strategy often employed, especially when students present their own
arguments in written assignments, is to simply ignore the issue of question begging altogether.
The other strategy is to wheel out claims about question begging at every opportunity with the air
of having played a trump. It is not clear whether these strategies are adopted due to a true
misunderstanding of what constitutes a question begging argument or merely for the sake of
convenience, but regardless it is a good idea for teachers to warn against both methods of
argumentation.
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The strategy of ignoring concerns about question begging is best seen, I think, by
considering the way in which students often approach the issue of whether abortion is morally
permissible. By far the most common pro-life argument goes something like this:
A fetus is an innocent person.
It is wrong to kill an innocent person.
Abortion constitutes killing a fetus.
______________________________
Abortion is wrong.
The pro-choice argument very often takes this form:
It is morally permissible for persons to do with their bodies what they please.
Women are persons.
When a woman has an abortion, she is doing with her body what she pleases.
______________________________________________________________
It is morally permissible for a woman to have an abortion
Now, given that these arguments are presented in the context of the abortion debate, both
are clearly problematic in that they are question begging. In both arguments the first premise is
very likely to be rejected by the other party to the debate. The pro-choice advocate is unlikely,
from the very beginning, to deem fetuses persons. The pro-life advocate is unlikely, from the
very beginning, to think that it is morally permissible for a person to do anything she wants with
her body. It is remarkable how often these facts are ignored (and not only by students in
philosophy classes) in the presentation of both arguments.
I take it to be fairly obvious that these arguments are terribly question begging, and I am
inclined to think that the vast majority of critical thinking instructors would agree that they are. I
present them only because they demonstrate why it is important to warn students against both
kinds of question begging. It is not enough to warn students against making circular arguments.
It is also necessary to show them why arguments like these are not going to persuade anyone
who does not already agree with the conclusions. It is perhaps unfortunate that arguments which
assume what they are meant to prove as well as arguments which make use of problematic
assumptions in the context of a debate are both referred to as question begging arguments. For
the two kinds of question begging are really two different fallacies, and there is a worry that
teachers will present only one of them and neglect to mention the other.
Unfortunately, however, presenting the context-relative form of question begging can
come at a steep price if an instructor is not very careful. For this kind of question begging is
sometimes overlearned. Any argument begs the question against some view, whether or not it is
a view anyone actually holds. The reason is well known: justifications must come to an end
somewhere and hence it is not possible to justify every premise in every argument. Some
students, realizing this, like to “refute” any argument whose conclusion they wish to avoid by
claiming that they reject one of the premises and hence that the argument is question begging.
When people adopt this strategy, it seems pointless to try to convince them of anything by way
of argument, and hence the very reason for teaching logic, critical thinking, and fallacies is
undermined.
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This strategy is clearly not intellectually honest. It seems everyone is willing to accept
more than a few propositions without justification. It is precisely this point which instructors
should make when introducing the concept of question begging arguments. It is important to
remind students why logic, critical thinking, and fallacies are important to know. It is important
to remind them that the whole point of presenting and evaluating arguments in the first place is
that arguments can be used to convince people of certain views. Carefully considering the worth
of an argument is not merely a game people engage in. Or, at least, it shouldn’t be. If you adopt
the strategy of deeming all arguments question begging, you are in effect saying that no
argument can convince you of anything. Presumably, not many people are going to want to
defend this view. If a student does honestly take this stance, then there is very little left to say.
But otherwise it seems reasonable to tell students that, when it comes to the fallacy of question
begging, they are on the honor system: they should only demand justification for those premises
that they honestly doubt or reject. This seems to be the only proper way for anyone to approach
the issue of context-relative question begging, and it is advisable to make students aware of the
unhappy consequences associated with approaching it in any other way.

Slippery Slope
Unfortunately it is sometimes thought that all slippery slope arguments are fallacious. I
suggest that there are non-fallacious as well as fallacious slippery slope arguments, and hence
just because an argument takes the form of a slippery slope, that is not enough to conclude that it
is problematic. All slippery slope arguments rely on the repeated use of conditionals. Fallacious
slippery slope arguments rely on unjustified conditionals, whereas non-fallacious slippery slope
arguments rely on warranted conditionals. Usually the relevant conditionals go unstated, so it is
very often difficult to determine which conditionals are needed in order for the argument to go
through. To determine whether a slippery slope argument is fallacious, it is sometimes helpful to
restate it in the form of a chain argument which makes use of repeated applications of modus
ponens. In principle, any slippery slope argument can be restated so that it looks something like
this:
A
If A then B
If B then C
If C then D
__________
D
Such an argument is clearly valid. So determining whether it is sound or not consists of
determining whether the premises are true. But usually this is easier said than done. The reason
an argument might be presented vaguely as a slippery slope instead of as an explicit chain
argument is that it relies on a great many conditionals. And, again, it is sometimes difficult to
determine which conditionals are required for the original slippery slope argument to go through.
Consequently, it is often difficult to reconstruct a slippery slope argument as an explicit chain
argument and hence difficult to determine whether all of the required conditionals are true or
justified. Still, it seems clear that some arguments deemed slippery slopes could be put in the
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form of a sound chain argument while at the same time preserving the basic content of the
original argument. Therefore, not all arguments deemed slippery slopes are fallacious. At the
very least, it is worth bringing this point to students’ attention.
One way to try to determine whether a slippery slope argument is fallacious is to ask
whether there is a single principle which is supposed to serve as the justification for the many
(and usually unstated) conditionals on which the argument relies. If it is likely that the argument
relies on such an underlying principle, then we should ask whether that principle is justified,
whether it really supports the premises of the argument, and whether it is applied consistently
throughout the argument. To see how this method works, consider the following argument, often
given by American gun control opponents:4
If the government is allowed to outlaw handguns, it will soon outlaw butcher knives.
It would be very undesirable for the government to outlaw butcher knives and hence this should
not be allowed this to happen.
_____________________________________________________________________________
The government should not be allowed to outlaw handguns.
It seems reasonable to call this a slippery slope argument. But is it fallaciously slippery?
The slope is suggested by the first premise. This conditional certainly seems terribly
implausible, in part because it hints at and relies on several unstated conditionals (e.g., If the
government is allowed to outlaw handguns then it will also outlaw shotguns; If the government
outlaws shotguns then it will outlaw rifles; If the government outlaws rifles then it will outlaw
______; If the government outlaws ______ then it will outlaw butcher knives.) It is very
questionable whether any of these conditionals are true. But the idea seems to be that there is an
underlying principle that is itself justified and which justifies each of these conditionals, thus
conferring justification on the first premise. So to determine whether this argument is fallacious,
we need to determine what that principle is, whether it really is justified, whether it really
warrants all of the unstated conditionals, and whether it is applied consistently. Some candidates
for the underlying principle include:
(1) The rationale for outlawing handguns is that anything which might be used as a weapon
should be outlawed.
(2) The rationale for outlawing handguns is that anything which is specifically designed to be
used to kill people should be outlawed.
(3) The rationale for outlawing handguns is that handguns are very often used in violent crimes
and hence outlawing them is likely to cause the rate of violent crimes to go down.
Principle (1) seems to fail the justification test. It is not itself plausible. Note, however,
that this principle would, if true, confer warrant on all of the unstated conditionals and hence on
the first premise as well. Principle (2) is perhaps more plausible, but it cannot confer warrant on
all of the unstated conditionals. It is impossible to use principle (2) to justify the claim that
government is likely to outlaw butcher knives. Principle (3), because it refers to the dangers
associated with handguns in particular, is also very unlikely to confer warrant on all of the
unstated conditionals.
It seems that it would be very difficult to come up with an underlying principle for this
argument that would meet all of our criteria. So it is wise to deem this particular slippery slope
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argument fallacious. But consider the kinds of arguments associated with the well-known sorites
paradoxes. Consider, for example, this argument:
If one grain of sand does not constitute a pile of sand, then neither do 50 zillion grains of sand.
If 50 zillion grains of sand do not constitute a pile of sand, then it is impossible to have a pile of
sand.
One grain of sand does not constitute a pile of sand.
_________________________________________
A pile of sand is impossible.
This argument too can be viewed as a slippery slope. Again the slope is suggested by the
first premise, and again this premise relies on several (actually, 50 zillion) unstated premises.
But unlike the gun control opponent’s argument, this slippery slope seems to rely on a principle
that meets all the criteria mentioned above. The principle is this:
If n pieces of sand does not constitute a pile of sand, then neither does n + 1 pieces of sand.
This statement is not entirely uncontroversial, but it is nonetheless fairly reasonable on its
face. And if true it confers warrant on each of the 50 zillion unstated conditionals in exactly the
same way, thus conferring warrant on the first premise of the argument. So it passes our
underlying-principle test. Hence it is at least plausible to suppose that the sorites argument is an
example of a non-fallacious slippery slope.
When introducing the idea of a slippery slope to students, it may not be necessary to give
the kind of detailed presentation I have provided here. But if I am correct, then it is probably a
good idea to emphasize that not all slippery slope arguments are fallacious. Otherwise, there is a
danger that students will see a fallacy where there isn’t one.

Conclusion
The reason that we teach fallacies is that fallacious arguments can sometimes look like
good arguments. We don’t want students to accept the conclusion of a fallacious argument, so
we show them the ways in which seemingly good arguments can go wrong. If what I have said
here is correct, then the same kinds of considerations hold for the fallacies themselves;
sometimes a decent argument can look like a fallacious one. So it is a good idea to warn students
against the misapplication of certain fallacies. I suggest that the best way to do this is to provide
examples, not only of arguments that do commit the fallacies, but also of arguments that do not
(but might appear to).
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Notes
1

In this paper I will not cite those textbooks which I think do a particularly good or bad job of
presenting informal fallacies since my primary concern has to do with how fallacies are taught
by instructors in the classroom. Suffice it to say that many critical thinking and introductory
logic textbooks do not mention the ways in which a non-fallacious argument might appear to be
fallacious. For the reasons give below, I think they should.

2

It should be noted that the ad populum fallacy is often defined as an appeal to emotion. I am
concerned here with a slightly different fallacy which is also sometimes called the ad populum
fallacy.

3

To avoid confusion, some textbook authors and instructors refer to the appeal to inappropriate
authority – the ad verecundiam fallacy, which is committed when an appeal is made to someone
who does not truly have any authority with respect to the issue under consideration.

4

To be fair, the slippery slope arguments offered by gun control opponents are not usually so
implausible as this one. I have chosen to use an argument with an outrageous first premise for
the sake of illustration.
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